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ABSTRACT. We adopt a welfarist approach to study sequencing problems in a private infor-
mation setup. The ”generalized minimum welfare bound” (GMWB) is a universal representation
of all the specific bounds that have been previously studied in the literature. Every agent is
offered a protection in the form of a minimum guarantee on their utilities. We provide a nec-
essary and sufficient condition to identify an outcome efficient and strategy-proof mechanism
that satisfies GMWB. We then characterize the entire class of mechanisms that satisfy outcome
efficiency, strategy proofness and GMWB. These are termed as the class of ”relative pivotal
mechanisms”. Our paper proposes relevant theoretical applications namely; ex-ante initial
order, identical costs bound and expected cost bound. We also give insights on the issues of
feasibility and/or budget balance.
JEL Classifications: C72, D63, D71, D82;
Keywords: sequencing problems, generalized minimum welfare bounds, outcome efficiency,
strategyproofness, feasibility, budget balance.
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Purpose. We live in an instant world where time is precious and convenience is an es-
sential prerequisite. The service sector is struggling under the burden of long waiting lines
that hamper customer satisfaction and their long term loyalty. This paper adopts a holistic
approach to analyze sequencing problems while prioritizing a customer’s well-being. One
might argue that a consumer can always exercise his option to walk away and not partic-
ipate in the mechanism. However, if we look deeper into our lifestyles, there are multiple
The authors are grateful to Arunava Sen, Debasis Mishra, Suresh Mutuswami and Souvik Roy for their helpful
comments and suggestions. The authors would also like to extend their gratitude to Larry Samuelson, Peter
Sudholter and Juan Moreno Ternero for their constructive feedback and comments.
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instances where waiting in a line to get our jobs processed is not optional but is either in-
evitable, voluntary or deemed as an absolute necessity. In such cases, the respective service
platforms often make an attempt to smoothen out the disutility of waiting and render a fair
treatment to all its customers. Our model offers the participating individuals a basic layer
of protection against the agony of waiting in a queue to avail a service. This is done by
guaranteeing each agent a minimum level of utility as and when his final welfare is real-
ized. Such an assurance acts as a safety net for an agent and tends to improve a consumer’s
overall satisfaction even in the face of adverse circumstances. This welfarist approach can
be justified through multiple real life examples of waiting-time guarantees on services as
well as scenarios where offering such a guarantee could benefit both service providers and
consumers at large.
Health care services and medical emergencies are an unavoidable part of our lives. In
Sweden, long waiting lines for surgical procedures pose a threat to the quality of their health
policy agenda. To reduce waiting lists, in 1992 the Swedish Government and the Federation
of County Council agreed on an initiative to offer a maximum waiting-time guarantee. Pa-
tients awaiting medical procedures are guaranteed a waiting time no longer than 3 months
from the physician’s decision to treat/operate (see Hanning [22]). Similarly, UK’s national
health service (NHS) provides emergency patients with a four hours target window within
which 95 percent of the patients need to be discharged or transferred1. India faces a massive
congestion of vehicles at the highway toll plazas. When an individual drives on the high-
way, waiting at a toll plaza to pay the toll tax is just as necessary as waiting at the airport
check-in counter or the boarding gate before departure. The National Highway Authority
of India (NHAI) ensures that the number of toll lanes/booths are such that, the service time
per vehicle during peak hours is not more than 10 seconds. The NHAI rules also suggest
an increase in the number of toll lanes if the waiting time of the users exceeds 3 minutes.
1https://www.nhsinform.scot/care-support-and-rights/health-rights/access/waiting-times
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Moreover, there are specific regions in the country where riders are exempted from paying
the toll tax altogether if the total waiting time surpasses 3 minutes.
The COVID-19 pandemic has caused immense difficulties for customer care representa-
tives at call centers2. With employees unable to work efficiently from home, callers are facing
unprecedented waiting times to make essential inquiries and lodging complaints (broken
gadgets, slow bandwidth, canceling airline tickets, etc). Hence, it is vital for government
agencies/companies to ensure their existing clientele does not experience extreme discom-
fort and lose their patience. Moreover, prolonged queues at blood-donation clinics act as
a major deterrent to voluntary donors 3. Blood collection organizations aim to be donor-
friendly in terms of their waiting time experience. Although the findings suggest a strong
sense of commitment to donation, a waiting time guarantee is required to preserve donor
satisfaction and avoid putting undue stress on voluntary donors.
1.2. Our framework. We work in a standard sequencing environment with a finite set of
agents. In our model, each agent has a single job to process using a facility that can only
serve one agent’s requirement at a time. It is assumed that no job can be interrupted once it
starts processing. A job is characterized by its processing time and an agent’s waiting cost.
The latter represents the disutility of waiting (per unit of time). The processing time of all
agents are publicly known while the waiting costs are private information. There is a well es-
tablished literature in this direction.4 We work in a private information set-up where agents
have quasi-linear preferences and the mechanism designer allows for monetary incentives.
Businesses often resort to monetary and non-monetary incentives to induce better queue
management (express passes for peak hours at theme parks, off season discounts, airlines
providing priority check-ins against a nominal fee, Amazon charging for faster deliveries
2https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/04/14/customer-service-coronavirus/
3See McKeever, Sweeney, Staines [27] and Brummelen, Dijk, Hurk, Kort [39]
4See De [13], [14], De and Mitra [15], [16], Dolan [17], Duives, Heydenreich, Mishra, Muller and Uetz [18],
Hain and Mitra [21], Mitra [29], Moulin [32] and Suijs [38].
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and cashback offers for those willing to wait, etc). For sequencing problems, mechanism de-
sign under incomplete information was analyzed by Dolan [17], Hain and Mitra [21], Moulin
[32], Mitra [29] and Suijs [38]. A special case of sequencing problems where the processing
times of the agents are identical is called queueing problems. Queueing problems have also
been analyzed extensively from both normative and strategic viewpoints.5
1.3. Contribution to the literature. The sequencing and queueing literature has studied the
impact of imposing lower bounds on the utility function in various contexts. The most nat-
ural bound is the first come first serve protocol where there is a preexisting order in which
agents arrive. From the cooperative game perspective, sequencing games with initial order
was analyzed by Curiel, Pederzoli, Tijs [12] and, from the mechanism design perspective,
the queueing problem was addressed by Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [7] and by Gershkov
and Schweinzer [20]. There are other fairness bounds that have been studied from the nor-
mative viewpoint. Identical cost bound (ICB)6 requires that each agent receives at least the
utility he could expect under the egalitarian solution if all agents were identical to him. For
queueing problems, the notion of ICB was analyzed by Maniquet [26], Chun [3], Kayi and
Ramaekers [25] and Mitra [30]. Chun and Yengin [11] have introduced welfare lower bounds
with the k-welfare lower bound guaranteeing each agent his utility at the kth queue position
with zero transfer. Starting from the last position, the center progressively reduces k (thus
increasing the welfare levels) till there is a clash with certain budgetary requirements. In the
queueing literature, Gershkov and Schweinzer [20] honor an agent’s existing service rights
by defining individual rationality with respect to an existing mechanism (first come first serve
and random arrival schedules). They have examined whether efficient reordering is possible
when individuals are rational with respect to the status quo.
5See Chun [2], [3], Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [5], [6], [7], [8], Hashimoto and Saitoh [23], Kayi and Ra-
maekars [25], Maniquet [26], Mitra [28], [30], Mitra and Mutuswami [31] and Mukherjee [35].
6See Bevia [1], Moulin [33], [34], Steinhaus [37] and Yengin [41].
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We introduce the ”generalized minimum welfare bound”, which is a compact and unified
representation of all the existing bounds in the literature. Our welfarist approach gets en-
riched by this universal representation which encompasses the fairness bounds and any
other naturally/artificially constructed bound. The generalized minimum welfare bound
is type-dependent and guarantees an assured level of utility to every agent 7 ,8. By virtue
of the linear cost structure, one can easily observe that such a bound can be decomposed
and expressed as a product of two components- an agent’s own waiting cost, θi (we do not
consider interdependent waiting costs in this paper) and some function of the job process-
ing time vector, Oi(s). The component Oi(s) is the welfare parameter which varies depending
on the specific bound under consideration 9. For instance, say mechanism µ1 assures every
agent his worst case utility, i.e., when he is placed in the last position. Let, mechanism µ2
guarantee every agent the utility he would have obtained under the first come first serve
protocol. The welfare parameter Oi(s) under µ1 is the sum of the processing times of all
the agents while under µ2, it is the sum of his own processing time and the processing time
of all the agents preceding him in the initial order of arrival. The bound under µ2 is stricter
thanµ1 and guarantees a higher minimum welfare (unless of course the agent coincidentally
occupies the last position in the initial order too!)
1.4. Results. Under private information, we study the implications of a generalized min-
imum welfare bound in a sequencing problem with monetary transfers. Our first result,
identifies the “constrained welfare property” which is a condition that is both necessary and
sufficient to obtain outcome efficient and strategyproof mechanisms that satisfy the gener-
alized minimum welfare bound. Constrained welfare property requires that every agent’s
7This paper does not discuss the question of participation or tries to impose the individual rationality con-
straint (with respect to not getting the service) at any point.
8Every agent is entitled to getting his job processed. We work in a static framework where the facility starts
operating only after the finite set of agents have arrived.
9The welfare parameter of any agent purely depends on the job processing time vector (s) and not on the
waiting costs. Refer to how we define the job completion cost of an agent in the framework section below for
further clarity.
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welfare parameter must be bounded below by his job completion time when he occupies the
first position in the queue.
Given this property, our second theorem is a characterization result where we introduce
the class of ‘relative pivotal mechanisms’ which is a strict subset of the set of all VCG mech-
anisms and satisfies the generalized minimum welfare bound. For any given vector of wait-
ing costs, the main aspect of a relative pivotal mechanism is to construct a ‘benchmark’
waiting cost. This is based on an optimization exercise conducted using the welfare param-
eter of the agent and waiting costs of all other agents. Given the benchmark waiting costs of
all agents, under the relative pivotal mechanism, the transfer of each agent has three parts.
One part of the transfer depends on the difference between his welfare parameter and his job
completion time with this benchmark waiting cost. The other part of the transfer involves
calculating the externality caused by this agent with his waiting cost on all other agents rela-
tive to what would have happened if, ceteris paribus, this agent had the benchmark waiting
cost. The third part of the transfer is any non-negative valued function that depends on the
waiting cost of all other agents.
Moving forward, we address the issue of finding those relative pivotal mechanisms that
satisfy either feasibility or its stronger version, budget balance.10 We begin by identifying
the ”weighted net welfare” property which is a necessary condition to find mechanisms sat-
isfying generalized minimum welfare bounds, outcome efficiency and feasibility. We show
that when there are two agents, we can only get feasible (and not budget balanced) relative
pivotal mechanisms if and only if each agent’s welfare parameter equals the cost associated
with getting served last. For more than two agents we show that if the welfare parameter of
each agent is the cost associated with getting served last, then we can get budget balanced
(hence, feasible) relative pivotal mechanism.
10It is well-known that feasibility of a mechanism requires that the sum of transfers across all agents is non-
positive and budget balance requires that the sum of transfers across all agents is zero.
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1.5. Applications. We apply our general results to sequencing problems with a natural ex-
ante initial order (most commonly observed in our day to day lives). Our next application
captures the essence of fairness by constructing an egalitarian bound that treats agents iden-
tically such that no agent suffers due to the heterogeneity of other’s preferences. In our final
application, we allow for random arrival of queues. In other words, every possible ordering
of agents has an equal chance of arriving to avail a service.
For sequencing problems with initial order, there is a preexisting order on the agents.
Any sequencing problems with a given initial order satisfies the constrained welfare prop-
erty. Hence, for sequencing problems with initial order, achieving outcome efficiency and
eliciting private information boils down to reordering the existing initial order to the out-
come efficient order by using relative pivotal mechanisms. In this context we can show that
there is no feasible (and hence no budget balanced) relative pivotal mechanism.11
Under Identical Costs Bound (ICB), every agent receives at least as much as his utility in
the benchmark/reference economy. The reference economy for any agent i requires that all
other agents have the same waiting cost and processing time as agent i. Since agents are
identical in this sense, each of them has an equal right to the resource. As a consequence,
agent i can occupy any position in the queue with an equal chance. To define the Expected
Cost Bound (ECB) for sequencing problems, consider a reference economy where there are
no transfers, agents arrive randomly and every arrival order is equally likely. ECB requires
that the utility of each agent is no less than the expected cost of the agent associated with
random arrival where each arrival order is equally probable. For queueing problems, the
notions of ICB and ECB are equivalent. For all sequencing problems with ICB and ECB, both
the constrained welfare property as well as the weighted net welfare property get satisfied.
Given these two properties, we obtain the relative pivotal mechanisms with ICB and ECB.
We also show that for both these bounds, when there are three agents, we can get feasible
relative pivotal mechanisms only for queueing problems.
11For the queueing problem this impossibility was shown by Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [7] and our result
generalizes it to the sequencing problems.
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1.6. Implication in terms of queueing problems. For the queueing problems with gener-
alized minimum welfare bounds that satisfy the constrained welfare property, one can give
a more explicit form of the transfers associated with the relative pivotal mechanism. We
characterize the set of all mechanisms satisfying outcome efficiency, strategyproofness and
ICB (ECB) 12. For more than two agents, we provide a sufficient restriction on the welfare
parameter that guarantees the existence of budget balanced relative pivotal mechanisms.
The sufficiency condition also becomes necessary when welfare parameters are equal across
agents.
2. THE FRAMEWORK
Consider a finite set of agents N = {1, 2, . . . , n} who want to process their jobs using a
facility that can be used sequentially. The job processing time can be different for different
agents. Specifically, for each agent i ∈ N, the job processing time is given by si > 0. Let θiSi
measure the cost of job completion for agent i ∈ N where Si ∈ R++ is the job completion
time for this agent and θi ∈ Θ := R++ denotes his constant per-period waiting cost where
R++ is the positive orthant of the real line R. Due to the sequential nature of providing the
service, the job completion time for agent i depends not only on his own processing time si,
but also on the processing time of the agents who precede him in the order of service. By
means of an order σ = (σ1, . . . ,σn) on N, one can describe the position of each agent in the
order. Specifically, σi = k indicates that agent i has the k-th position in the order. Let Σ be
the set of n! possible orders on N. We define Pi(σ) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | σ j < σi} to be the
predecessor set of i in the order σ . Similarly, Fi(σ) = { j ∈ N \ {i} | σ j > σi} denotes the
follower (or successor) set of i in the order σ . Given a vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn++ and an
order σ ∈ Σ, the cost of job completion for agent i ∈ N is θiSi(σ), where the job completion
time is Si(σ) = ∑ j∈Pi(σ) s j + si. Note that, for any i ∈ N we write, ∑ j∈Pi(σ) s j = 0 if Pi(σ) = ∅.
The agents have quasi-linear utility of the form ui(σ , τi;θi) = −θiSi(σ) + τi where σ is the
12This is a generalization of the result by Chun and Yengin [11] where we eliminate the gap between the
necessary and sufficient conditions.
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order, τi ∈ R is the transfer that he receives and the parameter of the model θi is the waiting
cost. Given any processing time vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn++ define A(s) = ∑ j∈N s j and,
with slight abuse of notation, we denote a sequencing problem by Ω and we denote the set of
all sequencing problems with the set of agents N by S(N). A sequencing problem Ω ∈ S(N)
is called a queueing problem if s = (s1, . . . , sn) is such that s1 = . . . = sn. We denotes the set
of all queueing problems with the set of agents N by Q(N). Clearly, Q(N) ⊂ S(N) for any
given N (such that N is a finite set and n ≥ 2).
A typical profile of waiting costs is denoted by θ = (θ1, . . . ,θn) ∈ Θn. For any i ∈ N, let
θ−i, denote the profile (θ1 . . .θi−1,θi+1, . . .θn) ∈ Θn−1 which is obtained from the profileθ by
eliminating i’s waiting cost. A mechanism µ = (σ , τ) constitutes of a sequencing rule σ and
a transfer rule τ . A sequencing rule is a functionσ : Θn → Σ that specifies for each profile θ ∈
Θ
n a unique order σ(θ) = (σ1(θ), . . . ,σn(θ)) ∈ Σ. Because the sequencing rule is a function
(and not a correspondence) we will require a tie-breaking rule to reduce a correspondence to
a function which, unless explicitly discussed, is assumed to be fixed. We use the following
tie-breaking rule. We take the linear order 1 ≻ 2 ≻ . . . ≻ n on the set of agents N. For any
sequencing rule σ and any profile θ ∈ Θn with a tie situation between agents i, j ∈ N, we
pick the order σ(θ) with σi(θ) < σ j(θ) if and only if i ≻ j. A transfer rule is a function τ :
Θ
n → Rn that specifies for each profile θ ∈ Θn a transfer vector τ(θ) = (τ1(θ), . . . , τn(θ)) ∈
R
n. Specifically, given any mechanism µ = (σ , τ), if (θ′i ,θ−i) is the announced profile when
the true waiting cost of i is θi, then utility of i is ui(µi(θ
′
i ,θ−i);θi) = −θiSi(σ(θ′i ,θ−i)) +
τi(θ
′
i ,θ−i) where µi(θ
′




i ,θ−i)). Given any Ω ∈ S(N), any θ ∈ Θn
and any order σ ∈ Σ, define the aggregate cost as C(σ ;θ), that is, C(σ ;θ) := ∑ j∈N θ jS j(σ).
A sequencing rule is outcome efficient if it minimizes the aggregate job completion cost.
A mechanism implements a sequencing rule in dominant strategies if the transfer is such
that truthful reporting for any agent weakly dominates false reporting irrespective of what
other agents declare. Implementation of outcome efficient sequencing rules in dominant
strategies has been well studied in the literature on mechanism design under incomplete
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information. It is also well-known that, as long as preferences are ‘smoothly connected’ (see
Holmström [24]), outcome efficient rules can be implemented in dominant strategies if and
only if the mechanism is a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (see Clarke [9], Groves
[19] and Vickrey [40]).
Definition 1. A sequencing rule σ∗ is said to be outcome efficient if for any θ ∈ Θn, σ∗(θ) ∈
argminσ∈ΣC(σ ;θ).
The ratio of the waiting cost and processing time of any agent i, that is, θi/si is known as
the urgency index. From Smith [36] it follows that σ∗ is outcome efficient if and only if the
following holds: (OE) For any θ ∈ Θn, the selected order σ∗(θ) satisfies the following: For
any i, j ∈ N, θi/si > θ j/s j ⇒ σ∗i (θ) < σ∗j (θ). We say that a mechanism µ = (σ , τ) satisfies
outcome efficiency if σ = σ∗.
Suppose that a waiting cost of zero was admissible in the domain. Consider any outcome
efficient order σ∗(θ) for θ ∈ Θn. We define the “induced” order σ∗(0,θ−i) as follows:










σ∗j (θ)− 1 if j ∈ Fi(σ∗(θ)),
σ∗j (θ) if j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ)),
n j = i
In words, given θ ∈ Θn and given any i ∈ N, σ∗(0,θ−i) is the order formed by setting the
waiting cost of agent i at zero and hence moving agent i to the last position (following the
outcome efficiency condition of Smith [36] by admitting zero waiting cost of agent i) so that
only the agents in the set behind Fi(σ
∗(θ)) move up by one position under the outcome
efficient queue for the induced profile (0,θ−i).
Definition 2. For a sequencing rule σ , a mechanism µ = (σ , τ) is strategyproof (dominant
strategy incentive compatible) if the transfer rule τ : Θn → Rn is such that for any i ∈ N,
any θi,θ
′
i ∈ Θ and any θ−i ∈ Θn−1,
(2) ui(µi(θ);θi) ≥ ui(µi(θ′i ,θ−i);θi).
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For a given sequencing rule σ , strategyproofness of a mechanism µ = (σ , τ) requires
that the transfer rule τ is such that truthful reporting for any agent weakly dominates false
reporting no matter what others’ report.
Definition 3. A mechanism µ satisfies feasibility if for any θ ∈ Θn, ∑ j∈N τi(θ) ≤ 0.
Definition 4. A mechanism µ satisfies budget balance if for any θ ∈ Θn, ∑ j∈N τi(θ) = 0.
2.1. Generalized minimum welfare bounds. Given any sequencing problem Ω ∈ S(N),
let Oi(s) be the welfare parameter of agent i. Let O(N; s) := (O1(s), . . . , On(s)) ∈ Rn denote
the welfare parameter vector. We represent a typical sequencing problem with general-
ized minimum welfare bounds by Γ = (Ω, O(N; s)) where Ω ∈ S(N) and the associated
O(N; s) ∈ Rn is the welfare parameter vector.
Definition 5. For Γ , a mechanism µ = (σ , τ) satisfies generalized minimum welfare bounds
(GMWB)if the transfer rule τ : Θn → Rn is such that for any i ∈ N, any θi ∈ Θ and any
θ−i ∈ Θn−1,
(3) ui(µi(θi,θ−i);θi) ≥ −θiOi(s).
3. GMWB, OUTCOME EFFICIENCY AND STRATEGYPROOFNESS
Given any sequencing game with generalized minimum welfare bounds, Γ = (Ω, O(N; s)),
we first try to identify the restriction on O(N; s) for which we can get a mechanism satisfying
outcome efficiency, strategyproofness and GMWB. The property defined below puts a con-
straint on the welfare parameter, indicating that an agent will always need to incur atleast
the cost of his own processing time. Thus, the GMWB is no less than the cost of serving that
agent when he occupies the first position in the queue.
Definition 6. Any sequencing problem with generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ =
(Ω, O(N; s)) satisfies the constrained welfare property if O(N; s) = (O1(s), . . . , On(s)) is such
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that
(4) Oi(s) ≥ si ∀ i ∈ N.
Let G(N) be the set of all Γ satisfying the constrained welfare property given by condition
(4).
Theorem 1. The following statements are equivalent:
(SPC1) For a Γ we can find a mechanism that satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness
and GMWB.
(SPC2) Γ satisfies the constrained welfare property, that is, Γ ∈ G(N).
Given any Γ ∈ G(N) what is the set of all mechanisms that satisfy outcome efficiency,
strategyproofness and GMWB? The next result answers this question. Before going to the
result we introduce some notations and definitions. For any agent i ∈ N and any given
profile θ−i ∈ Θn−1, define the function
(5) Ti(xi;θ−i) := ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ
∗(xi,θ−i)) + {Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i))− Oi(s)}xi, where xi ∈ R+.
Observe that if Oi(s) > A(s) = ∑ j∈N s j, then Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) < Oi(s) for all xi ∈ Θ and hence
the function Ti(xi;θ−i) has no maximum value xi ∈ Θ though the function has a least upper
bound if we set xi = 0. Hence, if Oi(s) > A(s), we have Ti(xi;θ−i) < Ti(0;θ−i) < ∞ for all
xi ∈ Θ.13 One can also verify that even if Oi(s) = A(s), we have Ti(xi;θ−i) ≤ Ti(0;θ−i) < ∞
for all xi ∈ Θ. However, if Oi(s) < si, then Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) > Oi(s) for all xi ∈ Θ and the
function Ti(xi;θ−i) has neither a maximum nor a least upper bound. Hence, for the function
Ti(xi;θ−i) defined on xi ∈ Θ to have a least upper bound, the constrained welfare property
(of Definition 6) is necessary.
13Given (1), the order σ∗(0;θ−i) is well-defined and hence the function Ti(xi ;θ−i) is well-defined at xi = 0.
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Definition 7. An outcome efficient mechanism µp = (σ∗, τ p) is called a relative pivotal mech-
anism if τ p satisfies the following property: For any profile θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N,
(6) τ
p
i (θ) = {Si(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))− Oi(s)}θ∗i + RPi(θ) + hi(θ−i),
where, given the function Ti(xi;θ−i) (defined in (5)), θ∗i ∈ R+ is such that Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) ≥
Ti(xi;θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ, RPi(θ) := ∑
j∈N\{i}
(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsi and hi :
Θ
|N\{i}| → R+.
Let R(N) denote the set of all relative pivotal mechanisms defined in Definition 7.
Theorem 2. For any Γ ∈ G(N), an outcome efficient mechanism µ = (σ∗, τ) satisfies strate-
gyproofness and GMWB if and only if it is a relative pivotal mechanism, that is, µ ∈ R(N).
We try and explain Definition 7 and Theorem 2. It is well-known from Holmström [24]
that for outcome efficiency and strategyproof it is necessary that the mechanism µ = (σ∗, τ)
must be a VCG mechanism where the transfers satisfy the following property: For any
profile θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N, τi(θ) = −C(σ∗(θ);θ) + θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + gi(θ−i) where
gi : Θ
|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary. The relative pivotal mechanism given in Definition 7 is a VCG
mechanism which is obtained for each agent i ∈ N and each profile θ ∈ Θn by substituting
gi(θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) + hi(θ−i) where Ti(θ
∗
i ;θ−i) (resulting from the optimization exercise
in Definition 7) and the restriction hi(θ−i) ≥ 0 are necessary to satisfy the GMWB. After
appropriate simplification of the VCG transfer τi(θ) = −C(σ∗(θ);θ) +θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + gi(θ−i)
by using gi(θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) + hi(θ−i) we get that for all θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,
(7) τ
p
i (θ) = −C(σ∗(θ);θ) +θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) + hi(θ−i).
Simplifying (7) we get a subset of VCG mechanisms which we call relative pivotal mecha-
nisms (Definition 7). From the proof of Theorem 2 it is clear that given any relative pivotal
mechanism µp = (σ∗, τ p) ∈ R(N), for any θ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N, ui(µpi (θi,θ−i);θi) =
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−θiOi(s) + {Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) − Ti(θi;θ−i) + hi(θ−i)} ≥ −θiOi(s) since Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) − Ti(θi;θ−i) +
hi(θ−i) ≥ 0. Hence, GMWB is satisfied for all agents.
The sum RPi(θ) = ∑ j∈N\{i}(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsi in condition (6) captures
the relative pivotal nature of this sub-class of VCG mechanisms. Given any profile i ∈
N, any θ−i ∈ Θn−1 the ‘benchmark’ type θ∗i of agent i is obtained from the optimiza-
tion exercise in Definition 7 and if this θ∗i is taken along with θ−i ∈ Θn−1, then the re-
sulting benchmark outcome efficient order is σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i). Given any θi ∈ Θ, this bench-
mark order σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) may or may not be the same as the actual outcome efficient order
σ∗(θi,θ−i) though the relative order across the agents other than i remains unchanged.
14
Given σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) and σ
∗(θi,θ−i), we can have the three mutually exclusive and exhaustive
possibilities-(i) Pi(σ
∗(θi,θ−i)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), (ii) Pi(σ∗(θi,θ−i)) = Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), and,
(iii) Pi(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θi,θ−i)).
(R1) If Pi(σ
∗(θi,θ−i)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) (so that θ∗i ∈ [0,θi)), then relative to σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i),
agent i has inflicted an incremental cost of θ jsi to each agent j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) \
Pi(σ
∗(θi,θ−i)) under the actual order σ∗(θi,θ−i). Hence, for any j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) \
Pi(σ
∗(θi,θ−i)), we get |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))| = −1. Therefore, using the
sum in (6) it follows that agent i has to pay
RPi(θ) = ∑
j∈N\{i}
(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))|)θ jsi = − ∑
j∈Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)\Pi(σ∗(θi ,θ−i))
θ jsi.
When can we have θ∗i = 0? If for any agent i ∈ N we have Oi(s) ≥ A(s), then for
every θ−i ∈ Θn−1, Ti(xi;θ−i) is decreasing in xi ∈ Θ implying that by setting θ∗i = 0
we get Ti(0;θ−i) ≥ Ti(xi,θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ. In this case,
RPi(θ) = ∑
j∈N\{i}
(|Pj(σ∗(0,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))|)θ jsi = − ∑
j∈Fi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)
θ jsi.
14Specifically, for any σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) and σ
∗(θi ,θ−i), the relative order across the agents other than i remains
unchanged means that for any j, k ∈ N \ {i} with j 6= k, σ∗j (θ∗i ,θ−i) > σ∗k (θ∗i ,θ−i) if and only if and
σ∗j (θi ,θ−i) > σ
∗
k (θi ,θ−i).
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(R2) If Pi(σ
∗(θi,θ−i)) = Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) , then σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) = σ
∗(θi,θ−i) and agent i has
neither inflicted any incremental cost to any other agent nor has agent i induced any
incremental benefit for any other agent, that is, |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| = |Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))|
for all j ∈ N. Hence, using the sum in (6), it follows that
RPi(θ) = ∑
j∈N\{i}
(|Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))|)θ jsi = 0
.
(R3) If Pi(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θi,θ−i)) (so that θ∗i > θi), then relative to the outcome
efficient order σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i), agent i has given an incremental benefit of θ jsi to each
j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θi,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i) under the outcome efficient order σ∗(θi,θ−i).
Hence, for any j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θi,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i), we have |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| −




(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θi,θ−i))|)θ jsi = ∑
j∈Pi(σ∗(θi ,θ−i))\Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)
θ jsi.
Therefore, (R1), (R2) and (R3) explains how the sum RPi(θ) in (6) for agent i with type
θi, given θ−i is calculated based on the difference in the cost of all other agents N \ {i}
that results from the actual profile specific outcome efficient order σ∗(θi,θ−i) relative to the
benchmark outcome efficient order σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i). What follows from the above discussion is
that for all θ ∈ Θn and each i ∈ N, either |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))| ∈ {−1, 0} for all j ∈
N \ {i} or |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))| ∈ {0, 1} for all j ∈ N \ {i}. Equivalently, we cannot
find a profile θ ∈ Θn and an agent i ∈ N such that |Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))| = −1 for
some agent j ∈ N \ {i} and |Pk(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pk(σ∗(θ))| = 1 for other agent k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
3.1. Feasibility and budget balance. Before going to our results on identifying relative piv-
otal mechanisms that ensures outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and feasibility,
we first drop the strategyproofness requirement and provide a necessary restriction for get-
ting mechanisms that satisfy outcome efficiency, GMWB and feasibility.
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Definition 8. A sequencing problem with generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ =
(Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) satisfies the property of weighted net welfare if










For any sequencing problem with generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ = (Ω, O(N, s))
with Oi(s) = si for all i ∈ N, condition (8) fails to hold. For any sequencing problem with
generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) with Oi(s) ≥ (si + A(s))/2 for all
i ∈ N, condition (8) is satisfied. Let G(N)(⊂ G(N)) denote the set of all sequencing problems
with GMWB satisfying the constrained welfare property and the weighted net welfare.
Lemma 1. If for any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N), we can find a mechanism that satisfies
outcome efficiency, GMWB and feasibility, then Γ must satisfy the weighted net welfare,
that is, Γ ∈ G(N).
Remark 1. For any sequencing problem with generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ =
(Ω, O(N, s)), a good way to explain condition (8) is in terms of mean µ(s), variance V(s)
and coefficient of variation CoV(s) :=
√
V(s)/µ of the elements of the processing time








n + 1 + {CoV(s)}2
]
,
where wi(s) := si/A(s) for all i ∈ N.15
(i) If we have the queueing problem, that is if Ω ∈ Q(N) with s1 = . . . = sn = a > 0,
then µ(s) = a, CoV(s) = 0 and wi(s) = 1/n for all i ∈ N. Condition (9) holds if and
only if ∑ j∈N O j(s)/n ≥ (n + 1)a/2. Moreover, if we also require that the generalized
15To derive inequality (9) we have used the following equalities: ∑ j∈N s2j = nVar(s) + n{µ(s)}2 =
n{µ(s)}2{1 + Cov(s)} = A(s)µ(s){1 + Cov(s)}.
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minimum welfare bound of all the agents are identical, that is Oi(s) = B
∗ for all
i ∈ N, then condition (9) requires B∗ ≥ (n + 1)a/2.
(ii) It is well-known that CoV(s) ≤
√
n − 1 for any positive integer n and any s =
(s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn++. Therefore, a sufficient condition for (9) to hold for any sequencing
problem with generalized minimum welfare bounds Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) is obtained by
substituting CoV(s) =
√
n − 1 in (9) that yields ∑ j∈N w j(s)O j(s) ≥ nµ(s) = A(s).
Remark 2. Fix any N and any s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn++. Let O(N, s) denote the set of welfare
parameter vectors O(N, s) = (O1(s), . . . , On(s)) satisfying the constrained welfare property
and the weighted net welfare. It is obvious that the set O(N, s) is non-empty and convex.
It is non-empty since for Ō(N, s) = (Ō1(s), . . . , Ōn(s)) with Ōi(s) = (si + A(s))/2 for all
i ∈ N, inequality (8) holds. For convexity of O(N, s), observe that if O(N, s), O′(N, s) ∈
O(N, s) so that D(O(N, s)) ≥ 0 and D(O′(N, s)) ≥ 0, then, given (8) it easily follows
that for any λ∗ ∈ [0, 1] we get D(λ∗O(N, s) + (1 − λ∗)O′(N, s)) = λ∗D(O(N, s)) + (1 −
λ∗)D(O′(N, s)) ≥ 0 implying λ∗O(N, s) + (1 − λ∗)O′(N, s) ∈ O(N, s). For any i ∈ N, de-
fine Ei(s) := si +
(
∑ j∈N s j ∑k∈N\{ j} sk
)
/si and O
i(N, s) := (Ei(s), s−i).
16 It is easy to verify
that for any i ∈ N, Oi(N, s) = (Ei(s), s−i) ∈ O(N, s) since D(Oi(N, s)) = 0. Moreover,
given (8) it is also obvious that for any i ∈ N and any O(N, s) ∈ Rn++ such that Oi(N, s) ≥
O(N, s) and O(N, s) 6= Oi(N, s), we have O(N, s) 6∈ O(N, s). Therefore, for any i ∈ N,
Oi(N, s) is a boundary point of the set O(N, s). Further, for the same type of reasoning,
Ō(N, s) = (Ō1(s), . . . , Ōn(s)) ∈ O(N, s) such that Ōi(s) = (si + A(s))/2 for all i ∈ N is also
a boundary point of O(N, s). However, one can verify that ∑ j∈N w j(s)Oi(N, s) = Ō(N, s),
that is, Ō(N, s) is a weighted sum of the elements of the set {{Oi(N, s)}i∈N} with weight
wi(s) = si/A(s) for each i ∈ N. The set {{Oi(N, s)}i∈N} plays a key role in explaining
the set O(N, s). For any λ = (λ1, . . . , λn) ∈ [0, 1]n with ∑ j∈N λ j = 1, consider the vector
∑ j∈N λ jO j(N, s) = (λ1E1(s) + (1 − λ1)s1, . . . , λnEn(s) + (1 − λn)sn). One can verify that
16Note that if |N| = 2, then Ei = A(s) for any i ∈ N.
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O(N, s) is a non-empty and convex set given by
(10) O(N, s) =
{
O(N, s) ∈ RN++ | ∃λ ∈ [0, 1]n with ∑ j∈N λ j = 1, s.t. O(N, s) ≥ ∑ j∈N λ jO j(N, s)
}
.
Therefore, the set O(N, s) is non-empty and convex with the added property that any el-
ement in this set weakly vector dominates some weighted sum of the elements of the set
{{Oi(N, s)}i∈N}.
Given Lemma 1, from now on we restrict our attention only to the set G(N) of all sequenc-
ing problems with GMWB satisfying the constrained welfare property and the weighted net
welfare, that is, we consider any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) such that O(N, s) ∈ O(N, s) and the set
O(N, s) is given by (10) of Remark 2.
Definition 9. An outcome efficient mechanism µ̂p = (σ∗, τ̂ p) is called a minimal relative
pivotal mechanism if it is a relative pivotal mechanism with the property that for all i ∈ N and
all θ−i ∈ Θn−1, hi(θ−i) = 0, that is, for any profile θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N,
(11) τ̂
p
i (θ) = {Si(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))− Oi(s)}θ∗i + RPi(θ),
where θ∗i ∈ R+ ensures Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) ≥ Ti(xi;θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ and we have RPi(θ) =
∑
j∈N\{i}
(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsi.
Observe that if a relative pivotal mechanism µp = (σ∗, τ p) ∈ R(N) is feasible, then the
minimal relative pivotal mechanism µ̂p = (σ∗, τ̂ p) is also feasible since for any θ ∈ Θn and
any i ∈ N, τ pi (θ)− τ̂
p
i (θ) = hi(θ−i) ≥ 0. Therefore, for any Γ ∈ G(N), if we want to check
whether we can find a feasible relative pivotal mechanism or not, we simply need to check
the prospect of feasibility with the minimal relative pivotal mechanism µ̂p.
Proposition 1. For any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) such that |N| = 2 we have the following
results:
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(B2a) A feasible relative pivotal mechanism exists if and only if O1(s) ≥ A(s) and O2(s) ≥
A(s).
(B2b) There is no budget balanced relative pivotal mechanism.
Can we find budget balanced relative pivotal mechanisms for sequencing problems with
GMWB satisfying the constrained welfare and the weighted net welfare when there are more
than two agents?
Proposition 2. For any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) such that |N| ≥ 3 and Oi(s) ≥ A(s) for all
i ∈ N, we can find budget balanced relative pivotal mechanisms.
Remark 1 (ii) states that the weighted average of the welfare parameters is no less than the
aggregate processing time (specifically, ∑ j∈N w j(s)O j(s) ≥ A(s)) is a sufficient condition for
weighted net welfare property. Proposition 1 shows that the welfare parameter of each agent
is no less than the aggregate processing time is necessary and sufficient for feasibility relative
pivotal mechanisms when there are two agents and Proposition 2 shows that the same con-
dition is sufficient to get budget balanced relative pivotal mechanism when there are more
than two agents. What can we say about obtaining feasible relative pivotal mechanism for
any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) such that |N| ≥ 3 and there exists at least one agent with
Oi(s) ∈ (si, A(s))? It is difficult to answer this question in general as the transfers associated
with any relative pivotal mechanism lacks closed form representation. However, the follow-
ing example suggests that one would expect to get more restriction on the processing time
of the agents (over and above what is required under the constrained welfare and weighted
net welfare properties) to get feasible relative pivotal mechanisms.
Example 1. Consider any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) such that |N| = 3 and Oi(s) = si +
max j 6=i s j for all i ∈ N. Without loss of generality, assume that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3. Observe that
condition (8) holds since D(s) = s1(s2 − s3)/2 + s2(s1 − s3)/2 + s3(s1 − s2)/2 ≥ 0. Hence,
Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N). Consider the profile θ ∈ Θ3 such that σ∗j (θ) = n + 1 − j for
all j ∈ N and in particular θ3/s3 = a > θ2/s2 = b > θ1/s1 = c > 0. Using the function
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Ti(xi;θ−i) (in (5)), we can fix θ∗1 = s1b, θ
∗
2 = s2c and θ
∗
3 = s3c. Then, using the transfers
associated with the minimal relative pivotal mechanism (Definition 9), we get the following:
(1) τ̂1(θ) = s1s3b,
(2) τ̂2(θ) = −cs2(s1 − s3), and
(3) τ̂3(θ) = −cs3(s1 − s2)− s3s2b.
If s1 > s2 and a > b > c + c[s2(s1 − s3)/s3(s1 − s2)], then ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) = (b − c)s3(s1 − s2)−
cs2(s1 − s3) > 0 and feasibility gets violated. Hence, for feasibility to hold it is necessary
that s1 = s2 ≥ s3 which is a restriction on the processing time vector s = (s1, s2, s3).
4. APPLICATIONS
4.1. Sequencing with a given initial order. For a sequencing problem Ω ∈ S(N) with ini-
tial order, there is a preexisting order in which the agents have arrived to use the facility
and the job processing starts only after all agents have arrived to use the facility. This prob-
lem is the natural extension of the problem of reordering an existing queue (addressed by
Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [7] and by Gershkov and Schweinzer [20]) to the sequencing
problem. Suppose that initial order of arrival is σ0 ∈ Σ. In this case, the welfare param-
eter vector is Oσ
0
(N, s) = (Oσ
0
1 (s), . . . , O
σ0
n (s)) ∈ Rn++ where for each i ∈ N, Oσ
0
i (s) =
si + ∑ j∈Pi(σ0) s j and hence for any profile θ ∈ Θn, ∑ j∈N θ jOσ
0
j (s) = C(σ
0,θ). Let I(N) =
{(Ω, Oσ0(N, s)) | Ω ∈ S(N),σ0 ∈ Σ} denote the set of all sequencing problems with ini-
tial order. Every (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈ I(N) satisfies the constrained welfare property since for
each i ∈ N, Oσ0i (s) = si + ∑ j∈Pi(σ0) s j ≥ si. Moreover importantly, every (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈
I(N) satisfies the weighted net welfare since D(s) = ∑ j∈N s j{S j(σ0) − (s j + A(s))/2} =
∑ j∈N(s j/2){(∑k∈Pj(σ0) sk −∑k∈Fj(σ0) sk} = ∑ j∈N ∑k∈Pj(σ0)(s jsk/2)−∑ j∈N ∑k∈Fj(σ0)(s jsk/2) =
0 implying that condition (8) holds.17 Hence, we get I(N) ⊂ G(N). One can check that the
special feature of the relative pivotal mechanisms is that the function Ti(xi;θ−i) (defined in
17The reason for the last equality is the following: For any two agents j, k ∈ N, {k ∈ Pj(σ0) ⇔ j ∈ Pk(σ0)}
which implies that for any term of the form s jsk/2, there is exactly one term of the form −s jsk/2 that cancels it
out.
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(5)) has the following form:













4.2. Identical cost bounds. Identical cost bounds (ICB) requires that each agent i ∈ N re-
ceives at least the utility he could expect if all agents were like him (both in terms of waiting
cost as well as in terms of processing time) in a reference economy. This means that each
agent i ∈ N in his reference economy has an equal chance of facing each order from Σ.
Thus, ICB requires that for any agent i ∈ N and any profile θ ∈ Θn, ui(σ(θ), τi(θ);θi) ≥
−θi((n + 1)si/2) where θi((n + 1)si/2) represents the expected cost of agent i with wait-
ing cost θi and processing time si when all agents have the same processing time si and
agent i gets each of the positions 1 to n with probability 1/n. For a sequencing problem
Ω ∈ S(N) with generalized minimum welfare bounds given by ICB, the welfare param-
eter vector is Os(N, s) = (Os11 (s), . . . , O
sn
n (s)) ∈ Rn++ where for each i ∈ N, Osii (s) =
(n + 1)si/2. Let C(N) = {(Ω, Os(N, s)) | Ω ∈ S(N)} denote the set of all sequencing prob-
lems with ICB and let Γ s represent a typical sequencing problem with ICB in C(N). Since
for any (Ω, Os(N, s)) ∈ C(N), Osii (s) = (n + 1)si/2 > si for every i ∈ N, the constrained
welfare property is satisfied. Moreover, D(s) = ∑ j∈N s j{(n + 1)s j/2 − (s j + A(s))/2} =
∑ j∈N s j{∑k 6= j(s j − sk)} = ∑n−1j=1 ∑k> j(s j − sk)2 ≥ 0 and hence condition (8) also holds. There-
fore, C(N) ⊂ G(N). One can easily verify that the special feature of the relative pivotal
mechanisms in this context is that the function Ti(xi;θ−i) (provided in (5)) has the following
form:








∑ j∈Pi(σ∗(xi ,θ−i)) s j − ∑ j∈Pi(σ0) s j
]
xi .
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4.3. Expected cost bounds. The expected cost bounds (ECB) requires that the utility of each
agent is no less than the expected cost of the agent associated with random arrival where
each arrival order is equally likely. Formally, ECB requires the following property: For











20 Therefore, an equivalent representation of the ECB requirement is that for
any agent i ∈ N and any profile θ ∈ Θn, ui(σ(θ), τi(θ);θi) ≥ −θi S̄i.
For a sequencing problem Ω ∈ S(N) with generalized minimum welfare bounds given
the ECB conditions, the welfare parameter vector is OS̄(N, s) = (OS̄11 (s), . . . , O
S̄n
n (s)) ∈ Rn++
where for each i ∈ N, OS̄ii (s) = S̄i. Let E(N) = {(Ω, OS̄(N, s)) | Ω ∈ S(N)} denote the set
of all sequencing problems with ECB and let Γ S̄ represent a typical sequencing problem with
ECB in E(N). All sequencing problems with ECB as their generalized minimum welfare
bounds satisfy the constrained welfare property. In particular, observe that for any Γ S̄ ∈
E(N) and any i ∈ N, OS̄ii (s) = S̄i = si + ∑ j∈N\{i}(s j/2) > si implying that the constrained
welfare property given by condition (4) holds. Further, D(s) = ∑ j∈N s j{(s j + A(s))/2 −
(s j + A(s))/2} = 0 and hence condition (8) also holds. Therefore, E(N) ⊂ G(N). One can
verify that the special feature of the relative pivotal mechanisms in this context is that the
19Observe that for any i ∈ N, any θ−i ∈ Θn−1 and any xi ∈ R+,



















n! = S̄i states that the average completion time of each agent i equals S̄i. The sum in
S̄i has two components-own processing time si and half of the total processing time of all other agents j 6= i.
In any possible ordering σ ∈ Σ, an agent will always incur his own processing time and hence si enters S̄i
with probability one. Moreover, observe that any other agent j 6= i precedes agent i in any ordering σ if and
only if he does not precede agent i in the complement ordering σ c. Therefore, when we consider all possible
orderings to calculate agent i’s average completion time, s j for j 6= i will occur in exactly half of the cases as a
part of the completion time of agent i.
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function Ti(xi;θ−i) (in condition (5)) has the following form:
















Remark 3. Clearly, the bounds associated with ICB and ECB are different for any sequencing
problem which is not a queueing problem, that is, for any Ω ∈ S(N) \ Q(N). However, for
any queueing problem Ω ∈ Q(N) with s1 = . . . = sn = a > 0, S̄i = (n + 1)a/2 for all i ∈ N
implying that the notions of ICB and ECB are equivalent.
4.4. Feasibility and budget balance.
4.4.1. Sequencing with given initial order. Using Proposition 1 it follows that if we consider
any two agent sequencing problem with initial order (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈ I(N), then we cannot
find a mechanism that satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and feasibility
since for any agent (i say) having first position in the initial orderσ0, Oi(s) = si < A(s). The
discussion to follow shows that this impossibility result holds in general for any sequencing
problems with given initial order.
Remark 4. Consider any Γ 0 = (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈ I(N) such that |N| ≥ 3. We provide certain
observations about the minimal relative mechanism µ̂ = (σ∗, τ̂) with the Ti(xi;θ−i) function
given by condition (12).
(IO1) Let i ∈ N be that agent having first queueing position under that initial order σ0,
that is, Si(σ
0) = si. Then, for any profile θ ∈ Θn, θ∗i = si.{max{θ j/s j} j∈N\{i}} is
a solution to the maximization of the function T Ii (xi : θ−i) and we select σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)
such that Pi(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) = Pi(σ
0) = ∅. Therefore, we have θ∗i [Si(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) −
Oi(s)] = θ
∗
i [si − si] = 0 and hence using (12) it follows that the transfer associated
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with the minimal relative pivotal mechanism µ̂ = (σ∗, τ̂) for agent i ∈ N is
τ̂i(θ) = si ∑
j∈Pi(σ∗(θ))
θ j.
(IO2) Let k ∈ N be that agent having last queueing position under that initial order σ0,
that is, Si(σ
0) = A(s) = ∑ j∈N s j. Then, using argument similar to the one used in
(R1), it follows that for any θ ∈ Θn, θ∗k = 0 and Pk(σ∗(0,θ−k)) = Pi(σ0) = N \ {k}.
Therefore, we have θ∗i [Si(σ
∗(0i,θ−i)) − Oi(s)] = θ∗i [A(s) − A(s)] = 0 and hence
using (12) it follows that the transfer associated with the minimal relative pivotal
mechanism µ̂ = (σ∗, τ̂) for agent k ∈ N is
τ̂k(θ) = −sk ∑
j∈Fk(σ∗(θ))
θ j.
Points (IO1) and (IO2) of Remark 4 show that given a sequencing problem with initial or-
derσ0, the explicit form of the minimal relative pivotal transfers of the agents having the first
and last positions under the initial order σ0 are easy to derive. However, it is difficult to get
an explicit form of the minimal relative pivotal transfers for agents having other positions
under the initial order σ0. Despite this difficulty, using points (IO1) and (IO2) of Remark 4
and by appropriate construction of a profile we can prove the following impossibility result.
Proposition 3. For any Γ 0 = (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈ I(N) with |N| ≥ 3, there is no mechanism
that satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and feasibility.
4.4.2. ICB and ECB. Using Proposition 1 one can show that if we consider (Ω, Os(N, s)) ∈
C(N) with two agents N = {1, 2}, then we cannot find a mechanism that satisfies outcome
efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and feasibility since we require 3s1/2 ≥ A(s) and
3s2/2 ≥ A(s) to hold simultaneously which is impossible. Similarly, using Proposition 1 one
can also show that if we consider (Ω, OS̄(N, s)) ∈ E(N) with two agents N = {1, 2}, then
we cannot find a mechanism that satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB
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and feasibility since, for each i, j ∈ {1, 2} with i 6= j, we have si + s j/2 < A(s) = s1 + s2.
What happens when we have more that two agents?
Proposition 4. For any (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ C(N) ∪ E(N) such that |N| = 3, if we can find a
feasible relative pivotal mechanism, then Ω ∈ Q(N).
Proposition 4 states that when there are three agents, if we can find a mechanism satisfy-
ing outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, feasibility and, either ICB or ECB, then we must
have a queueing problem. It is well-known from the existing literature on queueing prob-
lems that, when there are three or more agents we can find mechanisms that satisfy budget
balance along with outcome efficiency, strategyproofness and ICB (or ECB).22 Therefore, be-
fore concluding, we analyze queueing problems with GMWB in greater details.
5. QUEUEING PROBLEMS
Throughout this section we assume without loss of generality that s1 = . . . = sn = 1,
and, given any queueing problem Ω ∈ Q(N), we define the welfare parameter vector as
O(N) = (O1, . . . , On) ∈ Rn. Therefore, we represent any queueing problem with GMWB as
Γ
Q = (Ω, O(N)). Any ΓQ = (Ω, O(N)) satisfies the constrained welfare property if O(N) =
(O1, . . . , On) is such that Oi ≥ 1 for all i ∈ N. One can easily verify that the special feature of
the relative pivotal mechanisms in this context is that the function Ti(xi;θ−i) (given by (5))
has the following form:
(15) TQi (xi;θ−i) = [σ
∗
i (xi,θ−i)− Oi] xi + ∑
j∈N\{i}
σ∗j (xi,θ−i)θ j.
For any queueing problem Ω ∈ Q(N), the welfare parameter vector associated with either
ICB or ECB is OB(N) = (OB1 , . . . , O
B




2 for all i ∈ N (see Remark 3). Given
22See Chun and Mitra [4], Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [6] and Kayi and Ramaekers [25] for a detailed dis-
cussions on symmetrically balanced VCG mechanisms.
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(15) we get that the function TQi (xi;θ−i) has the following form:









The discussion to follow identifies the explicit forms of the relative pivotal mechanisms.
Definition 10. For σ∗ and for any positive integer K ≤ |N|, a mechanism µk = (σ∗, τ (K)) is























θ j if σ
∗
i (θ) < K,
0 if σ∗i (θ) = K,
∑
j:K≤σ∗j (θ)<σ∗i (θ)
θ j if σ
∗
i (θ) > K.
See Mitra and Mutuswami [31] who introduce and characterize the K-pivotal mechanisms
for the queueing problems. Chun and Yengin [11] also provide another characterization of
these mechanism. We define a new set of mechanisms which are obtained by appropriately
mixing different K-pivotal mechanisms.
Definition 11. For any queueing problem, a mechanism µ̄a = (σ∗, τ̄ a) is a centered K-pivotal
mechanism with non-negative intercepts if for all θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,














i (θ) if n is even,
where for each i ∈ N, the function Hi : Θ|N\{i}| → R+.
Corollary 1. For any queueing problem Ω ∈ Q(N), a mechanisms satisfies outcome effi-
ciency, strategyproofness and ICB (ECB) if and only if it is a centered K-pivotal mechanism
with non-negative intercepts.
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Corollary 1 generalizes a result by Chun and Yengin [11] on outcome efficient, strate-
gyproofness and ICB (ECB) by eliminating the gap between their necessary and sufficient
conditions.
5.0.1. Symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism. The symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism
is defined for any queueing problem with three or more agents as follows.
Definition 12. Assume |N| ≥ 3. The mechanism µS = (σ∗, τS) is the symmetrically balanced
VCG mechanism if for all profiles θ ∈ Θn and all i ∈ N,













From the existing literature on queueing problems it is well known that the symmet-
rically balanced VCG mechanism satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness and ICB
(ECB) when there are three or more agents (see Chun and Mitra [4], Chun, Mitra and Mu-
tuswami [6] and Kayi and Ramaekers [25]). Given Corollary 1 it means that the symmetri-
cally balanced VCG mechanism is a centered K-pivotal mechanism with non-negative inter-
cept when there are three or more agents. Given more than two agents, consider that cen-
tered K-pivotal mechanism with non-negative intercept for which the Hi : Θ
|N\{i}| → R+
































if n is odd and n ≥ 3
where for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, θ(k)(θ−i) is the k-th ranked waiting cost from the profile
θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}| so that θ(1)(θ−i) ≥ . . . ≥ θ(n−1)(θ−i). One can verify that with the Hi :
Θ
|N\{i}| → R+ function given by (20), the resulting centered K-pivotal mechanism with
non-negative intercept is the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism.
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5.1. Feasibility and budget balance. From Proposition 1 it follows if there are two agents,
then for a queueing problem Ω ∈ Q({1, 2}) with the welfare parameter vector O({1, 2}) =
(O1, O2) we can find a mechanism satisfying outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB
and feasibility if and only if O1 ≥ 2 and O2 ≥ 2.
From Lemma 1 it follows that for any queueing problem we can find mechanisms satis-
fying outcome efficiency, GMWB and feasiblity only if condition (8) holds. Condition (8)
for any queueing problem reduces to the following inequality: ∑ j∈N Oi/n ≥ (n + 1)/2 (see
Remark 1(i)). This inequality requires that the average of the welfare parameters of all the
agents should be no less than (n + 1)/2. The next result shows that if the wefare parameter
of every agent is no less than (n + 1)/2, then we can find mechanisms that satisfy outcome
efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and budget balance.
Proposition 5. For any ΓQ = (Ω, O(N)) with |N| ≥ 3 and Oi ≥ n+12 for all i ∈ N, we
can find mechanisms that satisfy outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and budget
balance.
To prove Proposition 5, we make use of the fact that for any queueing problem with three
or more agents, the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism satisfies outcome efficiency,
strategyproofness, ICB (ECB) and, more importantly, budget balance (see Chun and Mitra
[4], Chun, Mitra and Mutuswami [6] and Kayi and Ramaekers [25]). Given Remark 1 (i), it
also follows that if all agents have identical Oi’s, that is, Oi = B
∗ for all i ∈ N, then condition
Oi = B
∗ ≥ n+12 for all i ∈ N is both necessary and sufficient for getting mechanisms that
satisfy outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, GMWB and budget balance.
6. CONCLUSION
The ”generalized minimum welfare bound” is imposed on an agent’s utility function to offer
him an assurance that his dissatisfaction level will not exceed a guaranteed amount. Such
a comprehensive and an all-inclusive bound will make future studies more compact and
convenient. We have already shown that GMWB is compatible with the standard desirable
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properties in the literature. An obvious extension would be applying GMWB to a dynamic
sequencing framework. One can also explore the implications of this bound when the wait-
ing costs of the agents are interdependent.
7. APPENDIX
Proof of Theorem 1: (SPC1) ⇒ (SPC2). It is well-known that for an outcome efficient
sequencing rule a mechanisms is strategyproof if and only if the associated transfer is
a VCG transfer (see Holmström [24]). The standard way of specifying the VCG trans-
fers for any sequencing problem Ω is that for all θ ∈ Θn and for all i ∈ N, τi(θ) =
−C(σ∗(θ)),θ) +θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + gi(θ−i), where for each i ∈ N the function gi : Θ|N\{i}| → R
is arbitrary.23 If in addition we require generalized minimum welfare bounds to be met,
then it is necessary that for any profile θ ∈ ΘN and any agent i ∈ N, Ui(σ∗(θ), τi(θ);θi) =
−C(σ∗(θ);θ) + gi(θ−i) ≥ −θiOi(s) implying that gi(θ−i) ≥ C(σ∗(θ);θ)−θiOi(s). Since the
function gi(θ−i) is independent of agent i’s waiting cost θi, we have the following:
(21) gi(θ−i) ≥ ḡi(θ−i) := sup
xi∈Θ
[Ti(xi;θ−i)] , Ti(xi;θ−i) := [C(σ∗(xi,θ−i); xi,θ−i)− xiOi(s)].
Observe that Ti(xi;θ−i) = [Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i))− Oi(s)]xi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ∗(xi,θ−i)).
Consider any profile θ̃ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N such that θ̃ j/s j = a > 0 for all j ∈ N \ {i}.
Consider any x′i, x
′′
i ∈ Θ such that x′i/si ≥ a ≥ x′′i /si and x′i > x′′i . If Oi(s) < si, then we have
(22) Ti(x
′












Moreover, for any xi > sia, Ti(xi; θ̃−i) = xi[si − Oi(s)] + ∑ j∈N\{i} θ̃ jS j(σ∗(xi, θ̃−i)) is increas-
ing in xi. Therefore, the x
∗
i that maximizes Ti(xi; θ̃−i) is then x
∗
i = ∞ implying that we do
not have a supremum. Therefore, for a supremum to exist it is necessary that Oi(s) ≥ si.
23See Mitra [29] and Suijs [38].
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(SPC2) ⇒ (SPC1). Consider any Γ that satisfies the constrained welfare property, that is,
consider Γ ∈ G(N). For any profile θ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N, consider the type x∗i ∈ Θ such
that it is a supremum for the function Ti(xi,θ−i).
Step 1: For any i ∈ N and any θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}|, there exists x∗i ∈ {{si(θk/sk)}k∈N\{i} ∪ {0}}
such that Ti(x
∗
i ;θ−i) ≥ Ti(xi;θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ.
Proof of Step 1: Consider any agent i ∈ N and any θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}| and we define the vector
R̃(θ−i) = ((R̃ j(θ−i) = θ j/s j)) j 6=i) of agent specific waiting cost to processing time ratio of
agents in N \ {i} and R(θ−i) = (R1(θ−i) = θ(1)/s(1), . . . , Rn−1(θ−i) = θ(n−1)/s(n−1)) be the
permutation of R̃(θ−i) such that R1(θ−i) ≥ . . . ≥ Rn−1(θ−i). We divide the proof into two
possibilities (a) Oi(s) ∈ [si, A(s)] and (b) Oi(s) > A(s).
Proof of Possibility (a): We first show that there exists x∗i ∈ [siRn−1(θ−i), siR1(θ−i)] that max-
imizes Ti(xi,θ−i). Observe that for any xi ∈ Θ, the function Ti(xi;θ−i) = [Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i))−
Oi(s)]xi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ
∗(xi,θ−i)). If xi > siR1(θ−i), then Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) = si and hence
Ti(xi;θ−i) = [si − Oi(s)]xi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) which is non-increasing in xi since by
interval property si ≤ Oi(s) implying that the coefficient of xi in Ti(xi;θ−i) is non-positive.
Hence, (i) if a maxima exists then we can always find a waiting cost x∗i ≤ siR1(θ−i) that
achieves it. Similarly, if yi < siRn−1(θ−i), then Si(σ∗(yi,θ−i)) = A(s) and hence it follows
that Ti(yi;θ−i) = [A(s)− Oi(s)]yi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jSi(σ∗(yi,θ−i)) which is non-decreasing in yi
since by interval property A(s) ≥ Oi(s) implying that the coefficient of xi in Ti(xi;θ−i)
is non-negative. Hence, (ii) if a maxima exists, then we can always find a waiting cost
x∗i ≥ siRn−1(θ−i) that achieves it.
The function Ti(xi;θ−i) is continuous and concave in xi on the interval
[siRn−1(θ−i), siR1(θ−i)] and the interval [siRn−1(θ−i), siR1(θ−i)] is compact.
24 Hence,
the function Ti(xi;θ−i) has a maxima in the interval [siRn−1(θ−i), siR1(θ−i)].
24From the functional form of Ti(xi ;θ−i) and given outcome efficiency it is obvious that given any θ−i, the
function Ti(xi ;θ−i) is continuous in xi on any open interval (siRk+1(θ−i), siRk(θ−i)) for all k ∈ {1, . . . , n −
2} and by using appropriate limit argument one can also show continuity at any point siRk(θ−i) for k ∈
{1, . . . , n − 1}. For concavity note that for any θ−i ∈ Θ−i, for every xi ∈ (siRk+1(θi), siRk(θi)) for all k ∈
{0, . . . , n}, where Rn+1 = 0 and R0 = ∞, Ti(xi ;θ−i) = [Si(σ∗(xi ,θi))− Oi(s)] xi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ js j(σ∗(xi ,θi)) is a
straight line. Moreover, Si(σ
∗(xi ,θi)) is non-increasing in xi ∈ R++. Hence, the slope Si(σ∗(xi ,θi))− Oi(s) is
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Given x∗i ∈ [siRn−1(θ−i), siR1(θ−i)] and given continuity of Ti(xi;θ−i), for two
agents the proof is complete since x∗i = siR1(θ j) = si(θ j/s j) and it follows that
Ti(θi(θ j),θ j) = [si − Oi(s)]si(θ j/s j) + θ j(si + s j). Therefore, consider the more than
two agents case. If there exists k ∈ N\{i} such that x∗i = si(θ(k)/s(k)) (so that
Ti(x
∗
i ;θ−i) = Ti(si(θk/sk);θ−i) ≥ Ti(xi;θ−i) holds for all xi ∈ Θ), then the proof is complete.















If ∑kr=1 s(r) + si − Oi(s) > 0, then for any xi ∈ (x∗i , siRk(θ−i)], σ∗(xi,θ−i) = σ∗(x∗i ,θ−i)




r=1 s(r) + si − Oi(s)
]
(xi −
x∗i ) > 0. Therefore we have a contradiction to our assumption that at x
∗
i the function
Ti(xi;θ−i) is maximized. If ∑kr=1 s(r) + si − Oi(s) < 0, then for any x′i ∈ [siRk(θ−i), x∗i ),
σ∗(x′i,θ−i) = σ




i ;θ−i) since Ti(x
′




r=1 s(r) + si − Oi(s)
]
(x′i − x∗i ) > 0. Again we have a contradiction to our assump-
tion that at x∗i the function Ti(xi;θ−i) is maximized. Therefore, the only possibility left is
∑
k
r=1 s(r) + si − Oi(s) = 0. However, in that case Ti(x∗i ;θ−i) = ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jSi(σ∗(x∗i ,θ−i)) and
for every xi ∈ [siRk+1(θ−i), siRk(θ−i)] the function Ti(xi,θ−i) attains its maximum value im-
plying that Ti(x
∗
i ;θ−i) = Ti(siRk+1(θ−i);θ−i) = Ti(siRk(θ−i);θ−i) and Step 1 continues to be
valid.
Proof of Possibility (b): If Oi(s) > A(s), then for any i ∈ N and any given θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}|, the
function Ti(xi;θ−i) on R+ is maximized if we set x∗i = 0. Since the function Ti(xi;θ−i) is only
defined on the domain Θn = R+ \ {0}, x∗i = 0 acts as a supremum of the function Ti(xi;θ−i)
and that Ti(0;θ−i) = ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ
∗(0,θ−i)) > Ti(xi;θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ.
Fix any i ∈ N. First, suppose that Oi(s) ∈ [si, A(s)]. Given the proof of Possibility (a)
of Step 1 and given any θ−i ∈ Θn−1, let us define x∗i := θ∗i so that Ti(x∗i ;θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i)
also non-increasing for xi ∈ R++. As a result the piece-wise linear continuous function Ti(xi ;θ−i) is concave
for xi ∈ R++.
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and there exists k ∈ N\{i} such that θ∗i = si(θk/sk). Consider the VCG transfer having the
following property: For all θ ∈ Θn and for all i ∈ N, τ∗i (θ) = −C(σ∗(θ);θ) +θiSi(σ∗(θ)) +
ḡi(θ−i) with ḡi(θ−i) := Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i). Then for any given θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N, we have
ui(µ
∗
i (θ),θi) +θiOi(s) = −[Si(σ∗(θ)− Oi(s)]θi + ḡi(θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ,θ−i)− Ti(θi,θ−i) ≥ 0. The
last inequality follows from the fact that Ti(θi,θ−i) ≤ Ti(θ∗i ,θ−i) for all θi ∈ Θ. Hence,
ui(µ
∗
i (θ),θi) ≥ −θiOi(s) implying that this VCG transfer satisfies the GMWB for agent i.
Next, suppose that Oi(s) > A(s). Given the proof of Possibility (b) of Step 1 and given any
θ−i ∈ Θn−1, let us define x∗i := 0 so that Ti(xi;θ−i) ≤ Ti(0;θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θ. Consider
the VCG transfer having the following property: For all θ ∈ Θn and for all i ∈ N, τ∗i (θ) =
−C(σ∗(θ);θ) +θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + ḡi(θ−i) with ḡi(θ−i) := Ti(0;θ−i). Then for any given θ ∈ Θn
and any agent i ∈ N, we have ui(µ∗i (θ),θi) +θiOi(s) = −[Si(σ∗(θ)− Oi(s)]θi + ḡi(θ−i) =
Ti(0;θ−i)− Ti(θi;θ−i) ≥ 0. Thus, using the constrained welfare property we have identified
VCG transfers that satisfies GMWB. 
Proof of Theorem 2: For outcome efficiency and strategyproof it is necessary that the mech-
anism µ = (σ∗, τ) must be VCG with transfers satisfying the following property: For any
profile θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N, τi(θ) = −C(σ∗(θ);θ) + θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + gi(θ−i) where
gi : Θ
|N\{i}| → R is arbitrary. For the GMWB condition to hold, in addition, it is necessary
that
(I) gi(θ−i) ≥ ḡi(θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) ∈ maxxi∈Θ Ti(xi;θ−i) and Ti(xi;θ−i) =
[Si(σ
∗(xi,θ−i))− Oi(s)]xi + ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jS j(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) (see condition (21) in the proof
of Theorem 1).
Hence, using (I) we can replace gi(θ−i) = hi(θ−i) + Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) where hi : Θ
|N\{i}| → R and
hi(θ−i) ≥ 0. By substituting gi(θ−i) = hi(θ−i) + Ti(θ∗i ;θ−i) in the transfer τi(θ) and then
simplifying it we get
(23) τi(θ) = [Si(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))− Oi(s)]θ∗i + ∑
j∈N\{i}
θ jδ ji(θ) + hi(θ−i),
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where δ ji(θ) :=
(
∑k∈Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) sk − ∑k∈Pj(σ∗(θ)) sk
)
. Observe the following:
(a) If Pi(σ
∗(θ)) = Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), then for any j ∈ N \ {i} we have Pj(σ∗(θ)) =
Pj(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), then it easily follows that δ ji(θ) = 0 = (|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| −
|Pj(σ∗(θ))|)si.
(b) If Pi(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θ)), then for agent any j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ)) \ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), we
have Pj(σ
∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) \ Pj(σ∗(θ)) = {i}. Hence, δ ji(θ) = si = (|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| −
|Pj(σ∗(θ))|)si.
(c) If Pi(σ
∗(θ)) ⊂ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)), then for any j ∈ Pi(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) \ Pi(σ∗(θ)), it easily
follows that Pj(σ
∗(θ)) \ Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i)) = {i}. Therefore, we obtain δ ji(θ) = −si =
(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)si.
By substituting the values of δ ji(θ) for possibilities (a), (b) and (c) in the sum ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jδ ji(θ)
of (23) we get the sum in (6).
From (I) condition (23) and the expansion of the sum ∑ j∈N\{i}θ jδ ji(θ) summarized in (a),
(b) and (c) we get τ = τ p.
To prove the converse, observe that since any µp is a particular type of VCG trans-
fers, µp is sufficient to ensure outcome efficency and strategyproofness. To complete the
proof we need to check the sufficiency of GMWB with µp. Consider any relative piv-
otal mechanism µp. For any θ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N, we have ui(σ∗(θ), τ pi (θ),θi) +
θiOi(s) = −θi[Si(σ∗(θ))−Oi(s)]+ [Si(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))−Oi(s)]θ∗i +∑ j∈N\{i}(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗i ,θ−i))|−
|Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsi + hi(θ−i) = Ti(θ∗i ,θ−i) − Ti(θ) + hi(θ−i) ≥ 0. Therefore, ui(µ
p
i (θ),θi) +
θiOi(s) ≥ 0 implying ui(µpi (θ),θi) ≥ −θiOi(s). Hence, any relative pivotal mechanism µp
satisfies the relevant generalized minimum welfare bounds. 
Proof of Lemma 1: Suppose Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) is a problem for which we can find
a mechanism that satisfies outcome efficiency, GMWB and feasibility and let µ = (σ∗, τ) be
such a mechanism. Then using GMWB it follows that for every θ ∈ Θn and each i ∈ N,
ui(σ
∗(θ), τ(θ);θi) = −θiSi(σ∗(θ)) + τi(θ) ≥ −θiOi(s) implying that for all i ∈ N, τi(θ) ≥
θiSi(σ
∗(θ)) − θiOi(s). By summing the transfers over all agents and applying feasibility
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it follows that C(σ∗(θ);θ) − ∑ j∈N θ jO j(s) ≤ 0. Hence, for the mechanism µ = (σ∗, τ) to





O j(s)− S j(σ∗(θ))
}
≥ 0, ∀ θ ∈ Θn.
Consider a set of profiles, θt = (θt1, . . . ,θ
t
n) ∈ Θn defined for any positive integer t such that
θtj = s j[1 − { j/(2tn)}] for all j ∈ N. Observe that for any given t and any l, m ∈ N such
that l < m, θtl/sl > θ
t
m/sm so that for every positive integer t, we have the same outcome




j = j for all j ∈ N. Also observe that as t → ∞,
θtj → s j > 0. Given (24), the condition ∑ j∈N θtj
{
O j(s)− S j(σ0)
}
≥ 0 must hold for every
positive integer t and hence it must also hold at the limiting value of t as well, that is, it must





O j(s)− S j(σ0)
}
≥ 0.
If we can show that the equality ∑ j∈N s jS j(σ0) = ∑ j∈N s j{s j + A(s)}/2 holds, then one can
easily verify that using this equality in (25) we get the result.25 Hence, our final step is to






















































Therefore, from (26) we get the required equality and the result follows. 
25Specifically, if ∑ j∈N s jS j(σ0) = ∑ j∈N s j{s j + A(s)}/2, then expanding the left hand side of (25) we get
∑
j∈N
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Proof of Proposition 1: Consider any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) with N = {1, 2} and, given
constrained welfare property assume without loss of generality that O1(s) = s1 + λ1s2 and
O2(s) = s2 + λ2s1 where λ1 ≥ 0 and λ2 ≥ 0. If θ = (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 is any profile such that
θ1/s1 > θ2/s2, then, given θ
∗
i = siθ j/s j if λi ∈ [0, 1) and θ∗i = 0 if λi ≥ 1 for any i, j ∈ {1, 2}




1 (θ1,θ2) = −min{λ1, 1}θ2s1 and τ̂
p
2 (θ1,θ2) = (1 − min{λ2, 1})θ1s2.
Therefore, from (27) it follows that
(28) τ̂
p
1 (θ1,θ2) + τ̂
p
2 (θ1,θ2) = [(1 − min{λ2, 1})θ1s2 − min{λ1, 1}θ2s1] .
Feasibility requires that τ̂
p
1 (θ1,θ2) + τ̂
p
2 (θ1,θ2) ≤ 0 for all θ = (θ1,θ2) ∈ Θ2 and for any
θ1 and any θ2 such that θ1/s1 > θ2/s2, (I) (1 − min{λ2, 1})θ1s2 ≤ min{λ1, 1}θ2s1. If (1 −
min{λ2, 1}) > 0 (that is, if λ2 ∈ [0, 1)), then given any θ2 > 0 and any λ1 ≥ 0, by taking
any θ1 sufficiently large such that θ1 > min{λ1, 1}s1θ2/(1 − min{λ2, 1})s2 and making it
sufficiently large we have a violation of condition (I). Hence, λ2 ≥ 1. Similarly, if θ′ =
(θ′1,θ
′
2) ∈ Θ2 is such that θ′1/s1 < θ′2/s2, then, given λ2 ≥ 1, from the definition of minimal


























2) ≤ 0 for all θ′ = (θ′1,θ′2) ∈ Θ2 and hence
given (29) for any θ′1 and any θ
′




2/s2, for feasibility it is necessary that
(II) (1 − min{λ1, 1})θ′2s1 ≤ θ′1s2. If (1 − min{λ1, 1}) > 0 (that is, λ1 ∈ [0, 1)), then given any




1/(1 − min{λ1, 1})s1 we have a violation of condition (II). Hence, we
must also have λ1 ≥ 1. Therefore, for feasibility it is necessary that λ1 ≥ 1 and λ2 ≥ 1, that
is, O1(s) ≥ A(s) and O2(s) ≥ A(s).
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Conversely, if λ1 ≥ 1 and λ2 ≥ 1, then, from the definition of minimal relative pivotal
mechanism µ̂p = (σ∗, τ̂ p), it follows that for any θ ∈ Θ2, any i ∈ {1, 2} and any j ∈ {1, 2}







−θ jsi if Pi(σ∗(θ)) = ∅,
0 if Pi(σ
∗(θi(θ−i),θ−i) = { j},
It is immediate from (30) that for all θ1,θ2 ∈ Θ, then we get feasibility. Hence, we have the
first part of the result.
The proof of the second part, that is, any relative pivotal mechanism given by (30) is not
budget balanced, is a special case of Proposition 3 in De and Mitra [16] where we need to
replace linear sequencing rule by its special case of outcome efficient sequencing rule. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Consider any Γ = (Ω, O(N, s)) ∈ G(N) with the generalized min-
imum welfare bounds satisfying the following properties: Oi(s) ≥ A(s) = ∑ j∈N s j for all
i ∈ N. Observe that the constrained welfare property given by condition (4) holds for this
example as well. For any θ ∈ Θn and any i ∈ N, the function Ti(xi;θ−i) (given by Defi-
nition 7)) has a supremum at θ∗i = 0 for all i ∈ N implying that Pi(σ∗(0, ,θ−i)) ∪ {i} = n
and hence Si(σ
∗(0,θ−i)) = A(s) ≤ Oi(s). The reason is the following: For any i ∈ N
and any xi ∈ Θ such that Pi(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) ⊂ N \ {i} and Pi(σ∗(xi,θ−i)) 6= N \ {i}, the
function Ti(xi;θ−i)) is decreasing in xi since [Si(σ∗(xi,θ−i))− Oi(s)] = ∑ j∈Pi(σ∗(xi ,θ−i)) s j −
∑ j∈N\{i} s j = −∑ j∈Fi(σ∗(xi ,θ−i)) s j is negative. Therefore, for any i ∈ N, θ∗i = 0 implying that
agent i is always served last in the benchmark order σ∗(0,θ−i). Given θ∗i = 0, it is quite
easy to verify that (I) θ∗i [Si(σ
∗(xi,θ−i)) − Oi(s)] = 0 and (II) RPi(θ) = −∑k∈Fi(σ∗(θ))θksi.
Therefore, using (I) and (II) in Definition 7 we get that an outcome efficient mechanism
µp = (σ∗, τ p) is a relative pivotal mechanism if τ p satisfies the following property: For any
profile θ ∈ Θn and any agent i ∈ N,
(31) τ
p
i (θ) = − ∑
k∈Fi(σ∗(θ))
θksi + hi(θ−i),
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where hi : Θ
|N\{i}| → R+. Let n ≥ 3 and for all i ∈ N and all θ−i ∈ Θ|N\{i}|, suppose we set




/(n − 2) in the transfer given by (31). One can then
simplify the resulting transfers (31) and show that we get budget balance.26 
Proof of Proposition 3: Consider any Γ 0 = (Ω, Oσ
0
(N, s)) ∈ I(N) and, without loss of
generality, assume σ0 such that σ0i = i for all i ∈ N. Consider any θ ∈ Θn such that
θn/sn > θ1/s1 > . . . > θn−1/sn−1 so that P1(σ∗(θ)) = {n}, Pj(σ∗(θ)) = {1, . . . , j − 1} ∪ {n}
for all j ∈ N \ {1, n} and Pn(σ∗(θ)) = ∅. Consider the minimal relative pivotal mechanism
µ̂ = (σ∗, τ̂) (in Definition 9) with the Ti(xi;θ−i) function given by (12). It is easy to verify
the following:
(i) Given P1(σ
0) = ∅, from (IO1) of Remark 4 we have θ∗1 = s1θn/sn and
P1(σ
∗(θ∗1 ,θ−1)) = P1(σ
0) = ∅. Further, Pn(σ∗(θ∗1 ,θ−1)) \ Pn(σ∗(θ)) = {1} and
Pj(σ
∗(θ∗1 ,θ−1)) = Pj(σ
∗(θ)) for all j ∈ N \ {1, n}. Thus, τ̂1(θ) = (|Pn(σ∗(θ∗1 ,θ−1))| −
|Pn(σ∗(θ))|)θns1 = θns1.
(ii) Given Pn(σ0) = N \ {n}, from condition (IO2) of Remark 4 we get θ∗n =
snθn−1/sn−1 and Pn(σ∗(θ∗n,θ−n)) = Pn(σ
0) = N \ {n}. Moreover, Pj(σ∗(θ)) \
Pj(σ
∗(θ∗n,θ−n)) = {n} for all j ∈ N \ {n}. Hence, the transfer of n is τ̂n(θ) =
∑ j∈N\{n}(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗n,θ−n))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsn = −∑ j∈N\{n}θ jsn. Therefore, the
transfer of agent n does not involve the waiting cost θn.
(iii) Finally, consider any k ∈ N \ {1, n}. Observe that if xk = skθn/sn, then T Ik (xk;θ−k)) is
decreasing in xk since the coefficient of xk, that is [∑ j∈Pk(σ∗(xk ,θ−k)) s j − ∑ j∈Pk(σ0) s j] =
−∑k−1j=1 s j < 0. Hence, θ∗k 6= skθn/sn. Further, (|Pn(σ∗(θ∗k ,θ−k))| − |Pn(σ∗(θ))|)θnsk =
0 since Pn(σ∗(θ∗k ,θ−k)) = Pn(σ
∗(θ)) = ∅. Thus, the transfer of any agent
k ∈ N \ {1, n} does not involve the waiting cost θn of agent n and hence can
be expressed in the following form: τ̂k(θ) = θ
∗
k [∑ j∈Pk(σ∗(θ∗k ,θ−k)) s j − ∑ j∈Pk(σ0) sk] +
∑ j∈N\{k,n}(|Pj(σ∗(θ∗k ,θ−k))| − |Pj(σ∗(θ))|)θ jsk.
26We do not provide a formal proof since it is a special case of the proof of Theorem 1 in De and Mitra [16].
38 SREOSHI BANERJEE, PARIKSHIT DE, AND MANIPUSHPAK MITRA
From (i), (ii) and (iii) it follows that ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) = θns1 + ∑ j∈N\{1} τ̂ j(θ). From (i) and (iii)
above it also follows that the sum ∑ j∈N\{1} τ̂ j(θ) does not involve the waiting cost θn and
hence by defining T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) := ∑ j∈N\{1} τ̂ j(θ) we get
(32) ∑
j∈N
τ̂ j(θ) = θns1 + T (σ∗(θ);θ−n).
If ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) > 0, then we have a violation of feasibility and the proof is complete. There-
fore, assume ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) = θns1 + T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) ≤ 0. Given that T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) is inde-
pendent of θn, if we increase the waiting cost of agent n to any yn(> θn) by keeping θ−n
fixed, then the outcome efficient order remains unchanged (that is, σ∗(yn,θ−n) = σ∗(θ)
for all yn > θn) and the transfers of all but agent 1 continues to remain unchanged due to
above mentioned independence argument, that is, T (σ∗(yn,θ−n);θ−n) = T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) for
all yn > θn. Hence, we have
(33) ∑
j∈N
τ̂ j(yn,θ−n) = yns1 + T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) ∀ yn > θn.
Since the first term in the right hand side of condition (33) is increasing in yn and the second
term remains constant with a change in yn, it follows that by making yn sufficiently large




ns1 + T (σ∗(θ);θ−n) > 0 leading to a violation of
feasibility. 
Proof of Proposition 4: Consider any Γ s = (Ω, Os(N, s)) ∈ C(N) such that |N| = 3 and,
without loss of generality, assume that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3. Consider the profile θ ∈ Θ3 such that
σ∗j (θ) = j for all j ∈ N and in particular θ1/s1 = a > θ2/s2 = b > θ3/s3 = c > 0 and
assume that (i) a > max{cs1/s2, bs2/s3}. Since Osj(s) = (n + 1)s j/2 > si for all j ∈ N, using
the function TCj (x j;θ− j) given by (13), we can take θ
∗
1 = s1c, θ
∗
2 = s2a and θ
∗
3 = s3a. Then
using the transfers associated with the minimal relative pivotal mechanism (Definition 9)
with TCj (x j;θ− j) given by (13) we get the following:
(1) τ̂1(θ) = −cs1(s1 − s2)− bs1s2,
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(2) τ̂2(θ) = as2(s1 − s2), and
(3) τ̂3(θ) = as3(s1 − s2) + bs2s3.
If s1 > s3, then ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) = (s1 − s2)(as2 − cs1) + (s1 − s3)(as3 − bs2) = (s1 − s2)s2[a −
(cs1/s2)]+ (s1 − s3)s3[a− (bs2/s3)] > 0 (due to (i)) and we have a contradiction to feasibility.
Hence, for feasibility it is necessary that s1 ≤ s3 implying s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3 ≥ s1. Hence,
s1 = s2 = s3.
Consider any Γ S̄ = (Ω, OS̄(N, s)) ∈ E(N) such that |N| = 3 and, without loss of general-
ity, assume that s1 ≥ s2 ≥ s3. Consider the profile θ ∈ Θ3 such that σ∗j (θ) = j for all j ∈ N
and in particular θ1/s1 = a > θ2/s2 = b > θ3/s3 = c > 0. Since O
S̄
j (s) = (s j + A(s))/2 > si
for all j ∈ N, using the function TEj (x j;θ− j) given by (14), we can takeθ∗1 = s1b,θ∗2 = s2a and
θ∗3 = s3a. Then using the transfers associated with the minimal relative pivotal mechanism
(Definition 9) with TEj (x j;θ− j) given by (14) we get the following:

















If s1 > s3, then ∑ j∈N τ̂ j(θ) =
(a−b)
2 (s2s1 + s1s3 − 2s2s3) >
(a−b)
2 (s2s3 + s1s3 − 2s2s3) =
(a−b)s3(s1−s2)
2 ≥ 0 and we have a contradiction to feasibility. Hence, for feasibility we need
s1 ≤ s3 implying s1 = s2 = s3. 
Proof of Corollary 1: For any profile θ ∈ Θn and i ∈ N, consider the type θ∗i ∈ Θ
such that the function TQBi (xi,θ−i) (defined in (16)) takes the maximum value, that is,
TQBi (θ
∗
i ,θ−i) ≥ T
QB
i (xi,θ−i) for all xi ∈ Θn. Let r̄(θ−i) = ((r̄ j(θ−i) = θ j) j 6=i) be the vector
of agent specific waiting cost in N\{i} and ri(θ−i) = (r1(θ−i) = θ(1), . . . rn−1(θ−i) = θ(n−1))
be the permutation of r̄(θ−i) such that r1(θ−i) ≥ . . . ≥ rn−1(θ−i). We can verify that if n is
odd, θ∗i ∈ {r n−12 (θ−i), r n+12 (θ−i)} and when n is even, θ
∗
i = r n2 (θ−i). Using the resulting θ
∗
i
that maximizes the function TQBi (xi,θ−i) (defined in (16)), we have the following forms of
the relative pivotal mechanisms derived for the even and odd cases separately. If n is odd,
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then we get the transfer given by τoddi (θ) + hi(θ−i) where,

































and if n is even, then we get the transfer given by τ eveni (θ) + hi(θ−i) where,
(35)


































2 + 1 and n > 2,























2 and n > 2.




i (θ) is the simple
average of two K-pivotal mechanisms-one with K = n/2 and the other with K = n/2 + 1.
We can then generally express,














i (θ) if n is even.

Proof of Proposition 5: Given that for any queueing problem Ω ∈ Q(N), the symmetrically
balanced VCG mechanism satisfies outcome efficiency, strategyproofness, ICB (ECB) and
budget balance, it follows that with Oi = (n + 1)/2 for all i ∈ N (which is the bound
associated with ICB(ECB)), the result holds. In particular, for any θ ∈ Θn, the utility
of an agent i ∈ N associated with the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism satisfies
Ui(σ
∗(θ), τ sbi (θ);θi) ≥ −θi(n + 1)/2. Consider any queueing problem with generalized
minimum welfare bounds satisfying the following property: For all i ∈ N, Oi ≥ (n + 1)/2





+ βi. With the
A WELFARIST APPROACH TO SEQUENCING PROBLEMS WITH INCENTIVES 41
symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism we have that for each θ ∈ Θn and each i ∈ N,
Ui(σ










−βi, for any βi ≥ 0.
Therefore, the symmetrically balanced VCG mechanism also ensures outcome efficiency,
strategyproofness, budget balance and GMWB for any welfare parameter vector O(N) =
(O1, . . . , On) such that Oi ≥ (n + 1)/2 for all i ∈ N. 
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